Are AMTA's Invention Guidelines Actually "Pre-Professional?"

At the risk of cracking open the same can of worms that gets opened every couple of months on impeachments, MTC, and sometimes even actual AMTA board meetings, I wanted to hop on here and share a perspective on the ever-present invention of fact debate that I haven't come across yet. Recently, I've come to think the way AMTA currently interprets the rules on invention actively penalizes competitors for using the kind of pre-professional skills we need to pursue a career in law.

As a context, I, like most of the 20-somethings who do this activity, am intending to one day attend law school, which means that my summer away from spending my excess hours on the big MT has been spent prepping for the LSAT. That means I've spent a lot of hours looking at questions like this one:

"During the construction of the Quebec Bridge in 1907, the bridge’s designer, Theodore Cooper, received word that the suspended span being built out from the bridge’s cantilever was deflecting downward by a fraction of an inch (2.54 centimeters). Before he could telegraph to freeze the project, the whole cantilever arm broke off and plunged, along with seven dozen workers, into the St. Lawrence River. It was the worst bridge construction disaster in history. As a direct result of the inquiry that followed, the engineering “rules of thumb” by which thousands of bridges had been built around the world went down with the Quebec Bridge. Twentieth-century bridge engineers would thereafter depend on far more rigorous applications of mathematical analysis. Which one of the following statements can be properly inferred from the passage?

(A) Bridges built before about 1907 were built without thorough mathematical analysis and, therefore, were unsafe for the public to use.
(B) Cooper’s absence from the Quebec Bridge construction site resulted in the breaking off of the cantilever.
(C) Nineteenth-century bridge engineers relied on their rules of thumb because analytical methods were inadequate to solve their design problems.
(D) Only a more rigorous application of mathematical analysis to the design of the Quebec Bridge could have prevented its collapse.
(E) Prior to 1907 the mathematical analysis incorporated in engineering rules of thumb was insufficient to completely assure the safety of bridges under construction."

The correct answer here is option E, and you're supposed to use a specific set of logical principles to reach it. Basically, you're supposed to be concluding that because the Quebec Bridge was unsafe--due the engineering and mathematical analysis that went into building it--the other bridges build with those same standards of mathematical analysis are similarly suspect and not completely safe. To simplify the logical processes here as much as I possibly can, this problem basically is asking you to say "if A  (a bridge being built before 1907) means B (the bridge cannot be guaranteed to be safe), then when any situation has A it also means B"

Let's compare that to one of the more controversial invention opinions that AMTA dropped last December. I sampled this directly from AMTA's Competition Integrity Committee's advisory opinions, because while I can think of a couple better examples of actual scenarios that occurred during competition season, determining what exactly happened in those cases is sometimes a bit of a he-said, she-said situation.

Question: May Gelfand testify on direct examination that a pilot needs to complete at least 40 hours of flying, of which at least 20 must be done with a flight instructor, to get a Private Pilot License? Although not specifically in Gelfand’s affidavit, Gelfand has a Private Pilot License, and Roy explains in their affidavit the requirements needed to earn a Private Pilot License.
Answer: The proposed testimony above would violate the Improper Invention rule (AMTA Rule 7.21).

Here, if you approach the question of "should D.B. Gelfand be allowed to state the qualification requirements it takes to get a private pilot's license" with the same logic you would to answer that LSAT question, you would end up being in violation of AMTA's invention of fact guidelines. Applying the principle "if A (a licensed pilot) means B (they have experienced this specific set of training)  then any situation where A is means B" leads you to the conclusion that Gelfand, a witness stated to be a pilot, would be capable of speaking on the training a pilot needs. But AMTA's guidance disagrees, and goes on to elaborate that because Gelfand's affidavit doesn't explicitly state they possess this information, it cannot be testified to. What we see here is that coherence with AMTA's invention of fact rules requires not just disregarding the kind of logical reasoning that is tested in exams like the LSAT, but actively choosing not to practice it.

I think this comparison of types of problem-solving logic is relevant not particularly because of the impact it has on either of the two dissimilar law activities, but because of what it reflects about AMTA's educational mission. Most of us don't spend a lot of time reflecting on the principle of an "educational mission" behind the activity beyond being bored when it gets rambled about during NCT opening ceremonies, and while that's pretty fair--sometimes it's hard to see how squeezing twenty-two plane puns and an Australian accent into a 7 minute direct is really "educational"--it is important to remember that the people who run this activity do it with the idea that someday the experiences we take from it are going to develop the people we're becoming. And it's that idea in mind that really just...makes me sad about the fact that AMTA's rules are the way they are. The LSAT tests logical reasoning with questions like the above because they're supposed to be a pre-professional evaluator. The reason the LSAT wants you to make conclusions like "if A means B then any situation where A is means B" is because in real life, that's the actual approach you're supposed to take to interpreting the world. This logical reasoning is tedious, yes, especially when explained as painstakingly as I just did, but being able to do it is an important skill. It's a shame that AMTA doesn't reward use of that skill as exceptional, but instead penalizes and restricts it. Wouldn't it be a better educational experience for an activity which is grounded in the pretense of creating bright legal professionals to not clip the wings of people who think critically about the case materials, but instead allow that kind of thinking to be used as a competitive advantage?

That's the heart of the thought. I realize that this observation doesn't necessarily defend all instances of invention, and that there are lots of cases where the logic that goes into justifying a team's interpretation of the fact pattern requires a whole lot more logical leaps than the inferences the LSAT asks for. But I don't think that's the body of what's getting cut down with invention penalization now--at least not if the CIC opinions or cases this season were any evidence. Obviously the new invention guidelines haven't been around all that long, and it's possible the CIC adopts a more lenient understanding of the rules over the next few years. All I've got to say is I hope they do, because I think the activity is worse without letting competitors think as critically as they can about the facts they're given.

The issue with your analysis is that the prompt of the LSAT practice problem is a set of factual premises delivered to you by the omniscient LSAC question drafter that you must accept as true when answering the question. The reason that the CIC guidance does not allow Gelfand to testify to the hours requirement is that the hours requirement is a statement of fact asserted by Roy in Roy's affidavit. It is not a universal truth that we must accept as a logical premise.

To demonstrate the point, consider a slightly different set of facts: Campbell trips and falls as he walks towards the plane at the airfield and sues the airfield in a premises liability suit. Roy states in his affidavit that he trains pilots at that airfield all the time and there is an unsafe and unmarked divot at the airfield that one must step over to get to the planes. Gelfand says nothing in his affidavit about a divot, but states that he used to walk through the airfield all the time to get to planes. Is it fair for a team to call Gelfand and have him testify to the divot? Probably not, right? Roy could be lying. Gelfand may not remember such a divot from when he used to walk through the airfield. Perhaps the divot developed over time and did not exist when Gelfand used to walk through the airfield. One could extend this principle to even more severe factual scenarios.

The reason it seems egregious to you is likely because Roy's assertion of the hours requirement, unlike the example above, seems credible and uncontroversial, unlikely to be contested by a team in a mock trial round. But even then, there are still some things a contrarian could say as to why Gelfand's knowledge may not be one-to-one with Roy's testimony. Perhaps the requirements for flight training have changed between when Gelfand and Reese Campbell respectively trained to be pilots. Perhaps Roy is simply lying. Perhaps Gelfand does not remember what the requirement was. Because these "perhapses" are not answered by the case materials, one could argue that it is unfair for a team to assume Gelfand knows and agrees that the 40 hours requirement is true.

Question - as a California high school student unfamiliar with nearly any of AMTA’s guidelines, is there ever an objection employed for unfair extrapolation/invention of fact made by the opposing team? In California, the unfair extrapolation objection is made when the witness testifies on direct examination to something that wasn’t in the case packet. I recently went down a rabbit hole of discovering what happened during the 2019 final round and read AMTA’s sanctions and Bays’ appeal. To me it seems like the whole issue would’ve been solved if Rhodes could’ve objected to unfair extrapolation and, if sustained, Yale received a points deduction under California’s (specifically the CRF) rules of evidence. Could someone show me either where I went wrong in my conclusion or offer thoughts on the benefits (or existence to which I’m unaware) of an unfair extrapolation objection in AMTA?

There is no invention of fact objection in AMTA. The only in-round remedy for an improper invention is impeachment.

Got it. Does anyone think there'd be merit behind an unfair extrapolation objection in AMTA? It certainly gets messy in California so I tend to doubt it, but in some cases, impeachment is even messier.

Adding such an objection is unlikely, for a few reasons (that are all more or less related to resisting "breaking the fourth wall").

For the most part, the objections permitted in AMTA mirror the evidentiary objections made in real court (the Midlands [fictional state that college mock trial takes place in] Rules of Evidence closely mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence). This is helpful both in terms of providing a more accurate simulation of trial practice and to avoid confusing judges--who are normally alumni, lawyers, or law students with some familiarity with the FRE--or asking too much of them in preparing for volunteering (as opposed to CRF, where judges are asked to review materials and learn the unfair extrapolation objection ahead of time).

Of course, there are additional objections made in real court that are not permitted in AMTA, including objections based on other law, such as the Constitution, objections made during opening and closing, etc. In real life, if a party were to come forward with a surprising fact that sounds like it could be made up, the opposing party would not be able to object to an "unfair extrapolation" which would make no sense. Hence, in AMTA, this would be seen as breaking the fourth wall.

In real life there are remedies, however. One obvious option is to use extrinsic evidence that you already have on the record or that you investigate or seek out during the trial to prove that fact wrong. This is not great, even in real life, and is usually impossible in a mock trial round.

More notably, a party could impeach the witness testifying to the fact (contrary to what some AMTA community members may say, "impeachments by omission"--an impeachment that a fact testified was not previously disclosed by the witness--do occur in real life, especially in the context of police reports, etc., but they usually require more and more careful foundation than there is time for in an AMTA round), or otherwise preserve the issue, so that in an objection or motion, they could raise that they believe they were sandbagged by a fact that ought to have been disclosed during discovery (the process by which parties "discover" facts about their case prior to--and sometimes during--trial via mechanisms like witness interviews and depositions, exchange of documents, interrogatories, etc.). If the court agrees, the party could get remedies, that could include things like curative instructions (where the judge cautions the jury about the fact), continuances or delays to conduct further discovery or investigation, permission to introduce your own rebuttal evidence, or sanctions--essentially a punishment of the other party, that could include even legal relief like a new trial.

This "impeach and then complain later" approach is the remedy AMTA has settled on. However, when you complain, AMTA wants you complaining to them, not the presiding judge of the round. That way:
-  AMTA's reasonable inference standard can be applied by the committee that propogates it;
- the fourth wall is not broken;
- precious time before "all loss" (AMTA rounds have a hard cut-off of three hours from start-of-round to submission of ballots before both parties lose the round) is not wasted;
- there is not a heated, emotional, argument interrupting and distracting the round and throwing off the competitors;
- volunteer judges are not confused or annoyed;
- the scores of the parties are not unduly affected by an allegation of misconduct;
- etc.

One option often thrown around is that you should be able to make in-round discovery violation objections to the presiding judge, a la the CRF unfair extrapolation objection, where parties point out that the fact ought to have been disclosed in a witness statement and because it isn't the fact should be struck from the record. Recently, this has become a practice in terms of expert witnesses, with the addition of Midlands case law, that may be cited in-round, stating that any expert opinions not in the report create a "trial by ambush."

Certain teams even try it: some AMTA cases will include a stipulation to the effect of "both sides agree they have complied with all discovery obligations." I have seen this used offensively and defensively. Offensively as "hey, Judge, they said that they told us everything, but clearly they didn't," and defensively as "hey, Judge, why are they complaining about us not telling us something, even they agreed we told them everything we needed to" (the latter argument having some logical flaws in most instances).

Although it has merit, this method has some obvious flaws:
- The judges are not as familiar with the facts as the students and this type of objection would require a ton of explanation and document comparison. This would be confusing and a distraction, and there is not nearly enough time to do this in a round. In real life, such a dispute would, in all likelihood, require an adjournment to have a hearing or for parties to submit written briefing.
- Again, there's the issue that scores may be affected by the appearance of misconduct where there may not be any according to AMTA's ruleset.
- Sometimes it would require breaking the fourth wall/be unrealistic. Specifically because both parties may be innocent of a certain fact not being disclosed. In contrast to mock trial, where all witnesses and evidence presented by a party are pre-scripted by the team portraying the party and thus a fact invention is likely intentional sneakiness, in real life, many non-party, fact witnesses are not and should not be under such control of the parties. The reason this works for experts is because (a) experts are typically sophisticated and understand the need for disclosures, and often are testifying based on what they remember from their report, reviewed materials, and their field of expertise anyway, (b) they are hired and prepared by the opposing party, and (c) real-life "four corners" rules prohibiting experts testifying to things not previously disclosed in their reports/depositions. But, if eyewitness Old Man Jefferson did not tell either the Prosecution OR the Defense about a key fact before spilling it on the stand, it would be an uphill battle for Defense to argue that a Brady Violation occured.
- Etc.

As someone who competed in AMTA over ten years ago, I simply want to say: It wasn't always like this. Up until roughly the Yale Incident, there was really no such thing as a post-round "invention of fact" penalty. I suppose we knew it could happen if someone was like, making fake affidavits and trying to claim they were the real ones. But by and large the rule was: if it isn't in the case packet, you could fill in the gaps, and the remedy was an in-round impeachment - and nothing else! This definitely led to some outrageous inventions, but it was considered to be all in the game. It also meant that mastering impeachment and witness control was absolutely critical. We were the victims of some outrageous inventions, and it never once occurred to our program to run to the tab room. And on one occasion, we saw our slick invention destroyed on impeachment at the NTC and lost. I've seen AMTA and competitors muddle through the invention-of-fact rule in recent years, I've slowly come to the conclusion that the free-for-all system was better. But whether you agree with me or not, you should know AMTA operated under mucb, much looser rules for invention-of-fact for years - perhaps for most of its existence.